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YOU GOT TO LET ME KNOW; SHOULD I STAY OR SHOULD I GO?:
RESPONDING TO PENNSYLVANIA’S ADOPTION OF
THE PUBLIC SERVANT EXCEPTION IN
COMMONWEALTH v. LIVINGSTONE
ZACHARY KIZITAFF*
“It is better, so the Fourth Amendment teaches, that the guilty
sometimes go free than that citizens be subject to easy arrest.”1
I. IF I GO, THERE WILL BE TROUBLE, AND IF I STAY,
IT WILL BE DOUBLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO
THE POLICE OFFICER’S PREDICAMENT
A police officer drives along a Pennsylvania highway on a dark, deso-
late night.2  Ahead, the officer sees a vehicle pulled onto the shoulder of
the road.3  There is clearly someone inside the car, but the occupant has
not activated the vehicle’s hazard lights.4  There are a multitude of reasons
the driver may have pulled over.5  Perhaps the driver simply wished to
* J.D. Candidate, 2019, Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law;
B.A., 2016, West Chester University of Pennsylvania.  Thank you to the staff of the
Villanova Law Review for all of your hard work and thoughtful feedback
throughout the process of publishing this Casebrief.  I also would like to thank my
wife, Melanie, and our cat, Sophie, for all of your love and support during this law
school journey.  Last, but not least, I would like to thank my parents, Randy and
Tina, as well as my sister, Kate, for all of the love and support they have shown me
throughout the years.  Thank you, all.
1. Henry v. United States, 361 U.S. 98, 104 (1959).
2. See State Police in Pa., N.J. Double Down on Highway Patrols, LEHIGH VALLEY
LIVE, https://www.lehighvalleylive.com/warren-county/index.ssf/2017/02/
state_police_in_pa_ nj_double_d.html [https://perma.cc/VTY7-JXP2] (last visited
Jan. 15, 2018) (noting increased number of Pennsylvania police officers con-
ducting highway patrols).
3. See Safety, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, https://safety.fhwa.dot
.gov/geometric/pubs/mitigationstrategies/chapter3/3_shoulderwidth.cfm
[https://perma.cc/8KFY-SYU7] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (explaining highway
shoulders “provide a number of important functions,” including “maintenance ac-
tivity” and “emergency storage of disabled vehicles”).
4. See Are You Using Your Hazard Lights the Right Way?, FIRESTONE COMPLETE
AUTO CARE, https://blog.firestonecompleteautocare.com/driving/when-use-cars-
hazard-lights/ [https://perma.cc/JGP8-Y2AD] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (educat-
ing drivers on proper use of hazard lights, including when being pulled over, per-
forming roadside maintenance, occupying disabled vehicle, or participating in
funeral procession).
5. See Ten Stupid Reasons People Stop on the Hard Shoulder, MOTORING RESEARCH,
http://www.motoringresearch.com/car-news/10-stupid-reasons-people-stop-hard-
shoulder/ [https://perma.cc/MNN7-K4KK] (last visited Jan. 15, 2018) (listing
drivers’ articulation of ten stupid reasons for using shoulder, including one who
(537)
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safely send a text message, make a phone call, or clean up spilled coffee.6
But what if the driver is incapacitated, the vehicle’s electronic functions
are disabled, or there is some other ongoing emergency within the passen-
ger compartment?7  After the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s decision
in Commonwealth v. Livingstone,8 it is now unclear how our hypothetical
officer should approach this common scenario.9
Police officers are much more than investigators and crime-fighters.10
Their multi-faceted responsibilities include assisting those in distress and
responding to emergencies, even when it is clear no one has violated a
criminal statute.11  Courts refer to these assistance-providing functions as
thought word “fire” on vehicle’s display was warning sign when really it was just
display of Adele song on radio).
6. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 634-35 (Pa. 2017)
(describing Appellant’s argument: “[A] driver may need to look at a map, answer
or make a telephone call, send a text message, pick something up off the floor . . .
or, as in the instant case, enter an address into the vehicle’s navigation system.”).
But see id. at 640 (Baer, J., dissenting) (suggesting drivers should stop at rest stop or
gas station, rather than shoulder, for non-emergency stops).
7. See generally California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 599 (1991) (explaining
passenger compartment, as opposed to vehicle’s trunk, is the area of the vehicle in
which the driver and any passengers sit and to which they have ready access); The
Top Four Reasons for Roadside Breakdowns—and what to do about them, VERIZON,
https://www.networkfleet.com/the-top-four-reasons-for-roadside-breakdowns-and-
what-to-do-about-them/ [https://perma.cc/6Q2F-A5WX] (last visited Jan. 15,
2018) (listing top four causes of breakdowns as tire problems, dead battery, key
malfunctions, and mechanical failure).
8. 174 A.3d at 609.
9. See id. at 650 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Majority’s per se rule forces an
officer to choose between two equally hazardous scenarios.”).  Justice Mundy’s dis-
sent went on to explain these dangerous scenarios: “First, the officer keeps the
emergency lights off, pulls up behind the vehicle, and approaches the driver in the
dark.  Second, the officer declines to intervene at all, and keeps driving down the
highway.” Id.
10. See Michael R. Dimino, Sr., Police Paternalism: Community Caretaking, Assis-
tance Searches, and Fourth Amendment Reasonableness, 66 WASH & LEE L. REV 1485,
1486 (2009) (“The ‘often competitive enterprise of fettering out crime’ forms the
backdrop for much of our thought about policework and underlies much Fourth
Amendment doctrine, but actually represents only about one-fifth to one-third of
patrol officers’ activity.”) (quoting Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10,
14(1948)); Debra Livingston, Police, Community Caretaking, and the Fourth Amend-
ment, 1998 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 261, 261 (1998) (explaining local police responsibili-
ties are far more numerous than enforcement of the criminal law).
11. See Gregory T. Helding, Stop Hammering Fourth Amendment Rights: Reshaping
the Community Caretaking Exception With the Physical Intrusion Standard, 97 MARQ. L.
REV. 123, 139 (2013) (acknowledging police officers “respond to noise complaints,
mediate non-criminal disputes, assist the ‘ill or injured,’ ‘[take] lost property into
their possession,’ remove abandoned property, or are called on to act as surrogates
for a variety of society’s usual caregivers”); see also Ron Martinelli, Community Care-
taking Searches, POLICE: THE LAW ENFORCEMENT MAGAZINE http://www.policemag
.com/channel/patrol/articles/2016/04/ circumstances-that-permit-search-and-
seizure.aspx [https://perma.cc/9FZ4-EKZY] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018) (educating
police on community caretaking functions).
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an officer’s “community caretaking” responsibilities.12  Often, however, an
officer’s necessary community caretaking actions amount to a search or
seizure without the reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal ac-
tivity that the Fourth Amendment requires.  Accordingly, an issue arises
concerning the admissibility of any criminal evidence an officer discovers
while performing caretaking duties in this type of situation.13  The of-
ficer’s discovery of evidence may, nevertheless, be upheld under the Pub-
lic Servant Exception—this exception makes an officer’s seizure of an
individual lawful if the officer points to facts that are removed from crimi-
nal investigation and which reasonably led the officer to carry out the care-
taking duties.14
Our hypothetical officer faces a situation almost identical to the sce-
nario Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeremy Frantz confronted in Common-
wealth v. Livingstone.15  In Livingstone, Trooper Frantz saw the defendant’s
vehicle located on the shoulder of the Interstate, at night, and without its
hazard lights activated.16  This led Trooper Frantz to activate his overhead
12. See Helding, supra note 11, at 138-39 (“Community caretaking by itself is
not an exception to the warrant requirement; rather, it is a description of what
police do when they are not investigating crime.”).
13. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (explaining need for
exception to make search reasonable when search would otherwise violate Fourth
Amendment warrant requirement); Roger S. Hanson, The Common Carrier Drug Pro-
file: The Drug Interdiction Program and its Development in the Federal Courts, 18 W. ST. U.
L. REV. 637, 670 (1991) (explaining Supreme Court’s articulation of three levels of
police-citizen interactions: “(1) formal arrest; (2) temporary detention . . . with
‘founded’ or ‘reasonable suspicion’ that a crime has been, is being, or will soon be
committed; and (3) informal police-citizen contact, such as a simple street conver-
sation, which does not invoke or offend rights guaranteed under the [F]ourth
[A]mendment.”) (citing Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S. 491, 493 (1983)).  For expan-
sive background of numerous state and federal courts applying the Community
Caretaking Doctrine as an exception to the warrant requirement, see Helding,
supra note 11, at 139-48 (arguing doctrine has expanded significantly over recent
decades).
14. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-42 (1973) (ruling officers often
investigate things like car accidents even in absence of claims of criminal liability as
part of community caretaking functions); see also Commonwealth v. Livingstone,
174 A.3d 609, 637 (Pa. 2017) (articulating Pennsylvania test for Public Servant
Exception).
[I]n order for a seizure to be justified under the public servant exception
to the warrant requirement under the community caretaking doctrine,
the officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which
would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was
needed; the police action must be independent from the detection, inves-
tigation, and acquisition of criminal evidence; and, based on a considera-
tion of the surrounding circumstances, the action taken by police must
be tailored to rendering assistance or mitigating the peril.
Id.  For a broad overview of the Public Servant Exception, see Dimino, supra note
10, at 1486-94.
15. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 614 (describing scene Trooper Frantz ob-
served, leading him to believe driver needed assistance).
16. See id. (“Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeremy Frantz was traveling north-
bound on Interstate 79 . . . when he observed a vehicle pulled over onto the right
3
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emergency lights and pull his police cruiser alongside the defendant’s ve-
hicle to see if she needed assistance.17  Although the ensuing interaction
revealed that the defendant was intoxicated, the Supreme Court of Penn-
sylvania ruled that the defendant’s blood test and breathalyzer results were
inadmissible because Trooper Frantz violated the Fourth Amendment
when he seized the defendant without at least reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity.18
In reaching this conclusion, the Livingstone court created a per se rule
that an officer’s use of emergency lights seizes a driver for Fourth Amend-
ment purposes.19  Seeing police emergency lights, according to the court,
would not lead a reasonable person in the driver’s position to believe he
or she was free to leave the scene.20  Additionally, the Livingstone court
adopted the Public Servant Exception to the Fourth Amendment’s war-
rant requirement, which allows officers to temporarily seize individuals to
inquire about a need for assistance if such officer conduct is reasonable
and independent from a criminal investigation.21  The court, however, ul-
timately held that Trooper Frantz failed to articulate objective facts that
could serve as a basis for reasonably believing that there was an ongoing
shoulder of the road; the engine was running, but the hazard lights were not
activated.”).
17. See id. (explaining Trooper Frantz’s reasoning for activating emergency
lights and pulling alongside defendant’s vehicle).
18. See id. (describing defendant’s “hundred mile stare” and defendant look-
ing at officer with “glossy eyes” and explaining trooper’s conversation with defen-
dant).  The defendant told Trooper Frantz that she was a CEO of five companies;
she then became “an emotional wreck” and began “acting ‘confused.’” Id. at 614;
see also id. at 615-17 (discussing trial court’s and Superior Court’s reasoning that
led to denial of defendant’s motion to suppress); id. at 638 (vacating defendant’s
sentence and remanding for further proceedings).
19. See id. at 622 (“The fact that motorists risk being charged with violations of
the Motor Vehicle Code if they incorrectly assume they are free to leave after a
patrol car, with its emergency lights activated, has pulled behind or alongside of
them further supports our conclusion . . . .”).
20. See id. at 621 (“[W]e simply cannot pretend that a reasonable person, in-
nocent of any crime, would not interpret the activation of emergency lights on a
police vehicle as a signal that he or she is not free to leave.”).
21. See id. at 613 (taking opportunity to adopt Public Servant Exception).  In a
footnote, the court highlighted that labeling the Public Servant Exception an “ex-
ception” to the warrant requirement is a misnomer because in emergency situa-
tions, like the one in Livingstone, the Fourth Amendment would not require an
officer to do so, nor could an officer acquire a warrant, because the officer would
lack probable cause of a crime with which to convince a neutral magistrate to issue
a warrant in the first place. See id. at 626 n.11. (summarizing new test for Public
Servant Exception).
[F]or a seizure to be justified under the public servant exception . . . the
officer must point to specific, objective, and articulable facts which would
reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that assistance was needed;
the police action must be independent from the detection. . .of criminal
evidence; and . . . the action taken by police must be tailored to render-
ing assistance or mitigating the peril.
Id.
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emergency, which meant the exception did not justify his actions.22  Thus,
Trooper Frantz unlawfully discovered the evidence of the defendant’s
intoxication.23
This Casebrief argues that The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania’s
holding in Livingstone creates a high threshold for invoking the Public Ser-
vant Exception and will require police officers, prosecutors, and defense
counsel to adapt not only to the adoption of the exception itself, but also
to the high bar the court set for triggering the exception.24  Part II of this
Casebrief details the evolution of Pennsylvania case law concerning
whether an officer’s use of emergency lights seizes a driver.25  Part II also
explains the approaches other jurisdictions take regarding the Public Ser-
vant Exception.26  Part III then discusses the facts, procedural history, and
holding in Livingstone.27  Part IV offers advice to practitioners on how to
respond to Livingstone’s new rules.28  Lastly, Part V concludes by summa-
22. See id. at 638 (“Thus, we are constrained to hold that Trooper Frantz’s
seizure of Appellant was not justified under the public servant exception.”).
23. See id. (“Trooper Frantz was unable to articulate any specific and objective
facts that would reasonably suggest that Appellant needed assistance.”).  The court
then suggested that such facts might include a report of a vehicle in need of assis-
tance, hazard lights, or inclement weather; however, the court said observing the
driver during nighttime hours is not enough. See id. (identifying weakness in
Trooper Frantz’s reasoning to justify seizure).
24. See id. at 640 (Baer, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that the specific . . . facts
(that Appellant’s car was stopped on the shoulder of a highway, rather than a rest
stop, gas station, or the like) warranted the minimal intrusion of Trooper Frantz
slowly approaching in his vehicle and peering at Appellant to ensure her well-
being.”).
25. Compare Commonwealth v. Hill, 874 A.2d 1214, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(holding use of emergency lights would not be perceived by reasonable person as
officer’s attempt to render aid when driver did nothing more than lawfully pull to
the shoulder), with Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 562-63 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2004) (relying on driver’s use of hazard lights, slow driving, and location on
rural road at 3 a.m. to hold driver was not seized because such facts would have
made reasonable driver know officer used emergency lights for emergency pur-
poses).  For a further discussion of Pennsylvania precedent that discusses when an
officer seizes a driver see infra notes 29-96 and accompanying text.
26. See State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471, 475-76 (Mont. 2002) (analyzing public
servant exception under reasonableness standard); see also State v. McCormick, 494
S.W.3d 673, 680-85 (Tenn. 2016) (expounding upon reasonableness test laid out
in Lovegren); State v. Anderson, 362 P.3d 1232, 1237-42 (Utah 2015) (applying bal-
ancing test to public servant exception); Hawkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 216,
221-22 (D.C. 2015) (assessing public servant exception under hybrid of reasonable
and balancing approaches).  For a more detailed discussion on other jurisdictions’
approaches to the Public Servant Exception, see infra notes 29-96 and accompany-
ing text.
27. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 638 (vacating defendant’s sentence and re-
manding for further proceedings).  For more information regarding Livingstone,
see infra notes 97-139 and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996) (dem-
onstrating how caretaking argument can be applied to exigent circumstances).
For more detail on the advice that this Casebrief offers, see infra notes 140-190 and
accompanying text.
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rizing the takeaways from Livingstone and emphasizing the need for practi-
tioners to adapt to the change in case law.29
II. AIN’T NO STOPPIN’ US NOW . . . OR IS THERE?
A. Background of When Drivers Are Lawfully Seized
The Fourth Amendment expressly prohibits unreasonable searches
and seizures.30  Inquiry into whether law enforcement has violated this
prohibition is two-fold: did the officer seize the individual, and if so, was
the seizure reasonable?31  The United States Supreme Court ruled in
United States v. Mendenhall32 that a person is seized for Fourth Amendment
purposes “only if, in view of all of the circumstances surrounding the inci-
dent, a reasonable person would have believed that he was not free to
leave.”33
After finding that an officer seized an individual, a court must then
determine whether the seizure was reasonable.34  To prevent unreasona-
ble searches and seizures, law enforcement generally must acquire a war-
rant that is backed by probable cause.35  A warrantless search or seizure
29. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 640 (Baer, J., dissenting) (discussing rigor with
which majority applied new rules).  For a more in-depth articulation of the
takeaways from Livingstone, see infra notes 191-194 and accompanying text.
30. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV; see also Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19 (1968)
(explaining central inquiry under Fourth Amendment is “reasonableness in all the
circumstances of the particular invasion of a citizen’s personal security”).
31. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-18 (bifurcating analysis into two-part inquiry: was
defendant seized, and if so, was seizure reasonable).
32. 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
33. See id. at 554-55 (articulating test determining whether individual is seized
for Fourth Amendment purposes); see also Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621 (listing fac-
tors Pennsylvania Supreme Court considers when applying Mendenhall).  “[I]n or-
der to determine when a ‘stop’ has occurred, ‘subtle factors as the demeanor of
the police officer, the location of the confrontation, the manner of expression
used by the officer in addressing the citizen, and the content of the interrogatories
or statements,’ must be considered.” Id. (citing Commonwealth v. Jones, 378 A.2d
835, 839-40 (Pa. 1977)). See generally Hanson, supra note 13, at 670 (explaining
three levels of police-citizen interactions).
34. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 16-18 (explaining determining reasonableness of
seizure is second step in Fourth Amendment seizure analysis).
35. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2477 (2014) (“A warrantless search
is reasonable only if it falls within a specific exception to the Fourth Amend-
ment[‘s] warrant requirement.” (citing Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460
(2011))); see also Livingston, supra note 10 at 262 (acknowledging “warrant prefer-
ence theory” is traditional approach to Fourth Amendment).
One traditional view of the Fourth Amendment—a view that has found
expression in many Supreme Court opinions and that was famously
championed in recent times by Justice Stewart—holds that searches “con-
ducted outside the judicial process, without prior approval by judge or
magistrate, are per se unreasonable subject only to a few specifically es-
tablished and well-delineated exceptions.”  This “warrant theory” or “war-
rant preference theory” of the Amendment, though in no way mandated
by Fourth Amendment text, has profoundly shaped the evolution of
6
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 63, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 6
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol63/iss3/6
2018] NOTE 543
may, nevertheless, be reasonable if it falls within one of the traditional
exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement: consent, exi-
gent circumstances, the automobile exception, search incident to arrest,
or administrative procedures during the booking process.36
Fourth Amendment doctrine as it applies to police acting in a law en-
forcement or criminal investigative capacity.
Id. (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1976)). But see id. at 263-64
(suggesting Supreme Court occasionally turns away from Warrant Clause in favor
of general reasonableness test).  Professor Livingston explained the following:
There is an alternative view of the Fourth Amendment that might be
helpful in the evaluation of community caretaking intrusions. The Court
has recently “turned away from the specific commands of the warrant
clause” and toward a test of general reasonableness, at least in contexts
not involving criminal investigation.  Proponents of this approach argue
that reasonableness itself is the touchstone for assessing the propriety of
searches and seizures. They recognize that reasonableness may require
that certain Fourth Amendment intrusions be supported by probable
cause and by advance judicial authorization. The proliferation of excep-
tions to the probable-cause-and-warrant formula, however, itself demon-
strates that this formula cannot constitute the Fourth Amendment’s core.
Proponents of the reasonableness approach emphasize that determina-
tions of constitutional reasonableness are “pragmatic and contingent.”
Reasonableness is thus generally associated with highly contextual evalua-
tions of whether intrusions on privacy are sensible, appropriate, and con-
stitutionally tolerable, considering all the circumstances.
Id.
36. See Livingston, supra note 10, at 263-64; see, e.g., Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626
F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (discussing relationship between exigent circum-
stances and community caretaking); United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523
(6th Cir. 1996) (applying exigent circumstances exception to warrantless entry
into home in response to noise complaint); People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171,
174 (Mich. 2011) (discussing community caretaking doctrine’s applicability to
home fire); Commonwealth v. Simpson, No. 1799 EDA 2016, 2018 Pa. Super.
LEXIS 264, at *5-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (applying Public Servant Exception to
residence when officers responded to private alarm); Megan Pauline Marinos,
Comment, Breaking and Entering or Community Caretaking? A Solution to the Overbroad
Expansion of the Inventory Search, 22 GEO. MASON U. CIV. RTS. L.J. 249, 261-62 (2012)
(explaining often confusing and overlapping treatment by courts regarding com-
munity caretaking, exigent circumstances, and emergency aid doctrines).  Marinos
explained as follows:
Over the years, state and federal courts have muddled the distinction be-
tween the emergency aid exception to the warrant requirement and the
community caretaking exception to the probable cause and warrant re-
quirements.  Some courts have actually extracted the emergency doctrine
from the exigent circumstances exception and made it part of the com-
munity caretaking doctrine, developing an exception to the warrant re-
quirement that is independent of the exigent circumstances exception.
There is, however, a clear distinction between the two. Searches per-
formed pursuant to the community caretaking exception were originally
conceived to prevent physical injury and property damage in situations
separate from criminal investigations, while searches performed under
exigent circumstances consist of police acting without a warrant to serve
law enforcement interests that fulfill the probable cause requirement,
like preserving evidence or preventing suspects from fleeing.  There is an
emergency element to the exigent circumstances exception that does not
exist in Supreme Court community caretaking precedent.
7
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Despite ample Fourth Amendment guidance from the United States
Supreme Court, state and lower federal courts have developed an addi-
tional Fourth Amendment exception regarding seizures—the Public
Servant Exception under the Community Caretaking Doctrine.37  A war-
rantless seizure may be reasonable for Fourth Amendment purposes
under the Public Servant Exception if the officer’s actions were reasonably
aimed at providing assistance rather than investigating crime.38  An of-
ficer’s actions are reasonable if the officer articulates specific, objective
facts that would lead an experienced officer to believe a citizen needed
assistance.39
Pennsylvania did not recognize the Public Servant Exception before
Livingstone; moreover, a scenario like the one facing our hypothetical of-
ficer would never call for the exception.40  Rather, as illustrated below,
under a pre-Livingstone analysis, whether an officer ceased a driver by acti-
vating the police cruiser’s emergency lights depended on whether the
driver exhibited signs of distress.41  A driver showing signs of emergency
would assume he or she was free to leave because the officer’s use of emer-
Id.  For additional discussion of the exceptions to the Fourth Amendment’s war-
rant requirement, see Guide for Users, 39 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 1 (2010)
(indicating additional information on exceptions to Fourth Amendment’s warrant
requirement); Mary Elizabeth Naumann, Note, The Community Caretaker Doctrine:
Yet Another Fourth Amendment Exception, 26 AM. J. CRIM. L. 325 (1999) (noting there
is more information regarding exceptions to Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement).
37. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 626-27 (explaining Community Caretaking
Doctrine houses three exceptions to warrant requirement: “the emergency aid ex-
ception; the automobile impoundment, inventory exception; and the public ser-
vant exception”). See generally Dimino, supra note 10, at 1486-94 (providing broad
overview of development of Community Caretaking Doctrine).
38. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (articulating test for public servant excep-
tion); see also State v. Lovegren, 51 P.3d 471, 475-76 (Mont. 2002) (analyzing public
servant exception under reasonableness standard); State v. McCormick, 494
S.W.3d 673, 680-85 (Tenn. 2016) (expounding upon reasonableness test laid out
in Lovegren). But see Hawkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 216, 221-22 (D.C. 2015)
(assessing public servant exception under hybrid of reasonable and balancing ap-
proaches); State v. Anderson, 362 P.3d 1232, 1237-42 (Utah 2015) (applying bal-
ancing test to public servant exception).
39. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 634, 637 (“[I]n order for a seizure to be justi-
fied under the public servant exception to the warrant requirement under the
community caretaking doctrine, the officer must point to specific, objective, and
articulable facts which would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer that
assistance was needed . . . .”).
40. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Kendall, 976 A.2d 503, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2009) (explaining reasonable expectation that officer using lights to check on
driver who voluntarily pulled over was part of officer’s affirmative duty).
41. See Commonwealth v. Conte, 931 A.2d 690, 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007)
(holding reasonable driver pulled onto shoulder of highway at night would assume
officer stopping with emergency lights on would be for assistance rather than de-
tention purposes); Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 562 (Pa. Super. Ct.
2004) (holding defendant not seized because reasonable person would think of-
ficer’s activation of emergency lights was for assistance purposes).
8
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gency lights would be for assistance rather than detention purposes.42  Af-
ter Livingstone, where any use of emergency lights seizes a driver, the
Public Servant Exception is necessary to justify situations where an officer
activates the police cruiser’s emergency lights to mitigate an emergency,
without reasonable suspicion or probable cause of criminal conduct.43
B. Blinded by the Light: Fourth Amendment Seizure and Emergency Lights
The former rule in Pennsylvania was that an officer did not seize a
driver who voluntarily pulled to the shoulder of the road if the driver’s
conduct would lead a reasonable driver to assume that an officer’s use of
emergency lights was merely a way of facilitating that officer’s duty to pro-
vide assistance.44  In Commonwealth v. Johonoson,45 a Pennsylvania State
Trooper noticed the defendant driving on a rural road at 3:00 a.m.46  The
driver slowed down, turned on his hazard signals, and pulled to the shoul-
der of the road, which prompted the trooper to park his patrol car behind
the driver and activate the police cruiser’s emergency lights.47  The Penn-
sylvania Superior Court, however, upheld the lower court’s decision to
deny the driver’s motion to suppress the evidence of his intoxication.48
Because the driver voluntarily pulled over, drove slowly, used his hazard
42. Compare Commonwealth v. Hill, 874 A.2d 1214, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005)
(holding use of emergency lights would not be perceived by reasonable person as
officer’s attempt to render aid when driver did nothing more than lawfully pull to
shoulder), with Johonoson, 844 A.2d at 562-63 (relying on driver’s use of hazard
lights, slow driving, and location on rural road at 3:00 a.m. to hold driver was not
seized because such facts would have made reasonable driver know officer used
emergency lights for emergency purposes).
43. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 638 (articulating application of new rules).
[B]ecause a reasonable person in Appellant’s position would not have felt
free to leave after Trooper Frantz pulled his patrol car, with its emer-
gency lights activated, along side her vehicle, Appellant was seized. . . .
Furthermore, we recognize that a warrantless search or seizure may none-
theless be deemed reasonable . . . when conducted pursuant to the public
servant exception to the warrant requirement under the community care-
taking doctrine.
Id. at 638.
44. See Hill, 874 A.2d at 1219 (explaining driver not seized after doing no
more than lawfully pulling off to side of road because reasonable driver in situa-
tion would not expect officers to pull off road to render assistance); Johonoson, 844
A.2d at 562 (holding driver not seized because driving slowly on rural road at 3:00
a.m. with hazard lights on would lead reasonable driver to think officer would pull
over for assistance purposes).
45. 844 A.2d at 556.
46. See id. at 558 (describing background to officer-driver encounter).
47. See id. at 559 (explaining officer’s conduct immediately before approach-
ing driver’s vehicle).  The officer pointed to the facts that the driver was driving
substantially slower than the speed limit with his hazard lights activated. See id.
(providing reasons why officer pulled over with lights on).  The court also placed
heavy emphasis on the fact the driver pulled to the shoulder without any prompt-
ing from the officer.  See id. at 562 (analyzing drivers’ actions).
48. See id. at 563 (affirming lower court ruling that interaction between officer
and defendant was mere encounter, meaning defendant was not seized).
9
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lights, and was on a rural road at 3:00 a.m., the court found that a reasona-
ble person in the driver’s position would recognize that the officer used
the emergency lights to further his assistance of the driver.49  Thus, the
driver should have felt free to leave, and therefore, was not seized.50
The Superior Court reached the same conclusion in Commonwealth v.
Conte.51  In Conte, the officer received a radio dispatch, after dark, advising
him of a vehicle possibly needing assistance on the shoulder of a local
highway.52  Holding that the officer’s use of emergency lights did not seize
the driver, the Conte court explained, “In a nighttime, highway setting . . .
the citizen would interpret the officer’s activation of [emergency] lights
not as a signal of detention, but rather . . . as a means to both alert other
motorists of a roadside emergency and reassure the stranded citizen about
the officer’s identity.”53
In contrast, courts ruled that a reasonable driver would not feel free
to leave after doing nothing more than lawfully pulling to the side of the
road, without exhibiting any signs of emergency, because such a driver
would reasonably assume emergency lights were for detention purposes,
rather than as a means to render assistance.54  In Commonwealth v. Hill55
and Commonwealth v. Fuller,56 the Superior Court suppressed evidence of
each driver’s intoxication because each driver simply pulled to the shoul-
der of the road without demonstrating any indication of an emergency.57
The Hill and Fuller courts reasoned that voluntarily pulling over, even at
night, would not induce a reasonable person in each diver’s position to
believe the officer’s activation of emergency lights was for assistance pur-
poses.58  Exhibiting no signs of distress, the drivers should not have felt
free to leave upon seeing police emergency lights—this meant the officers
49. See id. at 562 (“By pulling over to the side of the road at 3:00 in the morn-
ing on a rural road, after driving slowly with his hazard lights on, Appellant should
have had reason to expect that a police officer would pull over and attempt to
render aid.”).
50. See id. (explaining why defendant was not seized).
51. 931 A.2d 690 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
52. See id. at 691 (explaining officer received call from dispatch advising of
vehicle stopped on shoulder of roadway).
53. Id. at 694.
54. See Commonwealth v. Fuller, 940 A.2d 476, 481 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (ex-
plaining driver was seized upon activation of emergency lights because reasonable
person would not feel free to leave when seeing emergency lights, despite not indi-
cating need for help).
55. 874 A.2d 1214 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005).
56. 940 A.2d 476 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007).
57. See id. (vacating verdict and sentence because trial court improperly ad-
mitted evidence of defendant’s intoxication); Hill, 874 A.2d at 1216 (affirming trial
court ruling to grant defendant’s motion to suppress evidence of his intoxication).
58. See Hill, 874 A.2d at 1219 (distinguishing Johonoson on grounds that driver
in instant case did nothing that would result in his reasonable expectation that
officer was activating emergency lights in order to provide aid to driver).
10
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unlawfully seized the drivers in both cases without at least reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity.59
The Superior Court then implicitly overruled Hill and Fuller and con-
siderably expanded this rule to the detriment of Pennsylvania motorists’
Fourth Amendment rights.60  The driver in Commonwealth v. Kendall,61 like
the drivers in Hill and Fuller, did nothing more than lawfully pull to the
side of the road.62  Despite the Hill and Fuller rulings, the Kendall court
held that the driver was not seized.63  Because no facts pointed to an emer-
gency, the Kendall court justified the officer’s actions by resorting to the
officer’s affirmative duty to provide assistance: “[The officer] had every
reason to pull over after Kendall to offer assistance . . . .  Failing to do so
would have been careless on the officer’s part.”64 Kendall shows that,
before Livingstone, anytime a driver voluntarily pulled to the shoulder of
the road at night, that driver should have assumed an officer’s emergency
lights were for assistance purposes.65 Johonoson, Conte, and Kendall made it
difficult for pre-Livingstone defendants to invoke Fourth Amendment pro-
tections in the roadside setting because drivers could generally assume
that an officer’s use of emergency lights were aimed at facilitating that
officer’s assistance-related duties.66
59. See Fuller, 940 A.2d at 481 (holding driver was not seized because he did
not demonstrate outward signs of need for assistance); see also Hill, 874 A.2d at
1219 (finding driver who did nothing more than pull to side of rode was seized by
emergency lights because reasonable driver would not think officer was providing
assistance rather than detaining driver).
60. See Commonwealth v. Kendall, 976 A.2d 503, 509 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
(Kelly, J., dissenting) (arguing case was indistinguishable from Hill and Fuller,
meaning majority erred when finding defendant was not seized).
61. 976 A.2d at 503.
62. See id. at 504 (“After following the [defendant’s] car for approximately
two or three minutes at a distance of fifty to one hundred feet, the driver activated
his turn signal and pulled off to the shoulder of the road.”).
63. See id. at 509 (affirming trial court’s finding of mere encounter between
driver and officer).  The court showed a high level of deference to the trial court’s
findings. See id. at 508-09.  After discussing the holding in Fuller, the court in
Kendall stated, “The ultimate decision is one the suppression judge must make
after hearing all of the testimony and determining the credibility of the witnesses.”
Id. at 508.
64. Id. at 508.
65. See id. at 509 (Kelly, J., dissenting) (“This case is indistinguishable on the
facts from [Fuller and Hill] . . . .”).  “Appellant was not speeding, and did not
swerve, veer off the road, or cross the center line.” Id.; see also id. at 508 (justifying
officer’s conduct based on officer’s affirmative duty to render assistance despite
motorist showing no signs of need for assistance).
66. See id. (explaining Kendall was indistinguishable from Hill and Fuller, so
the court should have found that the officer seized the defendant seized, thus
invoking Fourth Amendment protections); Commonwealth v. Conte, 931 A.2d
690, 693 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (holding reasonable driver pulled onto shoulder of
highway at night would assume officer stopping with emergency lights on would be
for assistance rather than detention purposes); Commonwealth v. Johonoson, 844
A.2d 556, 562 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (holding defendant was not seized because
11
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C. Help Me Officer; Help, Help Me Officer: Community Caretaking Doctrine
Recall that a warrantless seizure is presumptively unreasonable, and
the Commonwealth may only rebut the presumption if an exception to
the warrant requirement applies.67  One such exception is the Public Ser-
vant Exception under the Community Caretaking Doctrine.68  This excep-
tion makes the seizure of an individual reasonable if doing so is simply a
product of an officer carrying out his or her obligations to provide aid
during an actual or reasonably perceived emergency.69
The Community Caretaking Doctrine derives from the United States
Supreme Court’s ruling in Cady v. Dombrowski.70  In Cady, an out-of-town,
off-duty officer was incapacitated in a car accident that forced responding
officers to tow the vehicle to a local tow yard.71  The incapacitated, off-
duty officer was not carrying a weapon on his person.72  An officer re-
sponding to the accident believed that all officers from the police depart-
ment to which the incapacitated, off-duty officer belonged were required
to carry a service revolver at all times.73  The responding officer thus as-
sumed the gun was still in the vehicle located in the tow yard.74  Fearful
that the gun may have posed a danger to the community if anyone discov-
reasonable person would think officer’s activation of emergency lights was for assis-
tance purposes).
67. See Livingston, supra note 10, at 267 (“In an oft-quoted formulation of the
modern warrant preference theory, the Court concluded that searches conducted
outside the judicial process . . . ‘are per se unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment—subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated excep-
tions.’” (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967))); see also Dimino,
supra note 10, at 1487 (“Recognizing the difficulty of applying the warrant ‘require-
ment,’ or even a warrant ‘preference,’ to searches and seizures undertaken for a
purpose other than law enforcement, the Supreme Court has indicated . . . the
ordinary presumption that warrantless searches are unreasonable ceases to apply
in the ‘community-caretaking’ context.”). But see Livingston, supra note 10, at 291-
92 (advocating for Supreme Court to expand upon instances where it applied gen-
eral reasonableness test).
68. See Dimino, supra note 10, at 1488-94 (explaining doctrinal basis for com-
munity caretaking exceptions).
69. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 440-42 (1973) (ruling officers often
investigate things like car accidents even in absence of claims of criminal liability as
part of community caretaking functions); see also Commonwealth v. Livingstone,
174 A.3d 609, 620 (Pa. 2017) (acknowledging caretaking activities must be excep-
tion to warrant requirement surrounding seizure because if they were mere en-
counters there would be no need for exception in first place).
70. 413 U.S. at 433; see State v. Anderson, 362 P.3d 1232, 1237 (Utah 2015)
(discussing public servant prong’s origin in acknowledgment of Community-Care-
taking Doctrine in Cady).
71. See Cady, 413 U.S. at 434 (discussing facts of case).
72. See id. at 437 (describing local officers’ unsuccessful search of defendant’s
person for the latter’s service revolver).
73. See id. at 436-37 (explaining officer’s mistaken belief that defendant of-
ficer was required to carry service revolver at all times, per Chicago Police Depart-
ment requirements).
74. See id. (illustrating local officer’s search of defendant officer’s vehicle in
search of gun).
12
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ered it, the officer entered the vehicle in the tow yard in search of the
gun.75  Although he did not find a gun, the officer did find bloodied
clothes and a bloodied nightstick that ultimately led to the off-duty of-
ficer’s confession to a murder.76
The United States Supreme Court ruled that, while the officer’s entry
into the vehicle was a warrantless search, the lower court should not have
suppressed the evidence.77  The Court noted that an officer does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment when performing “caretaking functions, to-
tally divorced from the detection, investigation, or acquisition of evidence
relating to the violation of a criminal statute.”78  The Public Servant Ex-
ception under this Community Caretaking Doctrine then developed
within state and lower federal courts.79  These courts vary, however, as to
whether they use a reasonableness test, balancing test, or a mix of both
approaches.80
In State v. McCormick,81 the Supreme Court of Tennessee adopted a
reasonableness approach to the Public Servant Exception that thoroughly
demonstrates the factors that courts consider when determining whether
an officer’s proffered caretaking explanation is reasonable.82  The McCor-
75. See id. at 436-38 (describing officer’s search of vehicle).  The officer went
to the tow yard and, subject to standard procedure, entered the vehicle in search
of the gun in an attempt to prevent the gun from falling into the hands of a tres-
passer into the vehicle. See id. (explaining officer’s actions in tow yard).
76. See id. at 437 (recounting defendant’s admission to murder).  After of-
ficers confronted the defendant with the evidence they discovered at the tow yard,
which included a bloody nightstick with defendant’s name imprinted on it, the
defendant requested counsel. See id.  After conferring with counsel, the defendant
confessed he murdered the victim and disposed of the body on the defendant’s
brother’s farm. See id. (declaring his guilt based on evidence officer found in car).
77. See id. at 449 (reversing lower court ruling to suppress evidence based on
incorrect belief that officer’s conduct violated Fourth Amendment warrant
requirement).
78. Id. at 441.
79. See State v. Anderson, 362 P.3d 1232, 1237 (Utah 2015) (discussing public
servant prong’s origin in acknowledgment of Community Caretaking Doctrine in
Cady).
80. See, e.g., Hawkins v. United States, 113 A.3d 216, 221-22 (D.C. 2015)
(adopting hybrid of reasonableness and balancing tests in Washington, D.C.); see
also State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 687 (Tenn. 2016) (adopting reasonable-
ness test in Tennessee); Anderson, 362 P.3d at 1239 (adopting balancing test in
Utah); State v. Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 611 (Wis. 2009) (adopting balancing test
in Wisconsin). But see State v. Bakewell, 730 N.W.2d 335, 339 (Neb. 2007) (adopt-
ing totality of circumstances test in Nebraska).
81. 494 S.W.3d 673 (Tenn. 2016).
82. See id. at 687 (articulating reasonableness test for Public Servant Excep-
tion).  While multiple jurisdictions use a reasonableness test, all of which tend to
have their own slight variations, the Tennessee Supreme Court’s test in McCormick
nicely illustrates the core considerations courts assess when taking a reasonable-
ness approach to the Public Servant Exception. Compare id. (Public Servant Excep-
tion applies if “(1) the officer possessed specific and articulable facts which
reasonably warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action was
needed . . . and (2) the officer’s behavior and the scope of the intrusion were
13
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mick court held that the Public Servant Exception makes a warrantless
seizure reasonable when, “1) the officer possessed specific and articulable
facts which, viewed objectively in the totality of the circumstances, reasona-
bly warranted a conclusion that a community caretaking action was
needed . . . and 2) the officer’s behavior and the scope of the intrusion
were reasonably restrained and tailored to the community caretaking
need.”83  The court further held that an officer’s subjective intentions are
irrelevant, as long as the officer also articulated objective facts that reason-
ably indicated a citizen was in distress.84
In McCormick, an officer observed a van at 2:45 a.m. that was running
and had its headlights on, but was parked in a way that blocked an en-
trance to a shopping center.85  The officer turned on his emergency
lights, approached the vehicle, and found the driver slumped over the
steering wheel.86  The McCormick court ultimately held that the officer
seized the driver when the officer activated his emergency lights, but that
the seizure was reasonable under the Public Servant Exception because
both the position of the van and the early morning hours provided the
officer with reasonable belief that the driver was in peril.87
reasonably restrained and tailored to the community caretaking need.”), with State
v. Kleven, 887 N.W.2d 740, 743 (S.D. 2016) (“[T]he purpose of community care-
taking must be the objectively reasonable independent and substantial justification
for the intrusion; the police action must be apart from the detection, investigation,
or acquisition of criminal evidence; and the officer should be able to articulate
specific facts that . . . reasonably warrant the intrusion.”), and State v. Lovegren, 51
P.3d 471, 475-76 (Mont. 2002) (adopting reasonableness test in Montana).
[A]s long as there are objective, specific and articulable facts from which
an experienced officer would suspect that a citizen is in need of help or is
in peril, then that officer has the right to stop and investigate. Second . . .
the officer may . . . render assistance or mitigate the peril. Third, once . . .
the officer is assured that the citizen is . . . no longer in need of assis-
tance . . . then any actions beyond that constitute a seizure implicating . . .
the protections provided by the Fourth Amendment. . . .
Lovegren, 51 P.3d at 475-76.  Note, however, the Lovegren test is slightly different
than the other reasonableness approaches in that it states that an individual is not
seized until the point where an officer acts beyond his or her caretaking duties. Id.
at 476 (“[O]nce, however, the officer is assured that the citizen is not in peril or is
no longer in need of assistance or that the peril has been mitigated, then any
actions beyond that constitute a seizure. . . .”).
83. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d at 675.
84. See id. at 687 (“[A]n action is ‘reasonable’ . . . regardless of the individual
officer’s state of mind, ‘as long as the circumstances, viewed objectively, justify the
action.’  The officer’s subjective motivation is irrelevant.”).
85. See id. at 676 (describing scene that led officer to believe driver was in
distress).
86. See id. (describing officer’s conduct upon arriving on scene).
87. See id. at 688 (applying newly adopted reasonableness test regarding Pub-
lic Servant Exception).  “The specific and articulable facts, viewed objectively and
in the totality of the circumstances, reasonably warranted Sgt. Trivette’s conclusion
that . . . community caretaking action was necessary and appropriate.” Id.
14
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The Supreme Court of Utah created a balancing test in State v. Ander-
son88 that illustrates the individual and state interests that courts in some
jurisdictions weigh when determining whether the Public Servant Excep-
tion justifies an officer’s conduct.89  The Anderson court held, “If the level
of the State’s interest in investigating whether a motorist needs aid justifies
the degree to which an officer interferes with the motorist’s freedoms in
order to perform this investigation, the seizure is not ‘unreasonable’
. . . .”90  Courts that use a balancing test look to the seriousness of the
perceived emergency and whether the display of authority and length of
delay correspond to the level of the apparent distress.91
In Anderson, the driver was pulled to the side of the road with his
hazard lights activated.92  The officers, believing the driver may have been
in distress, activated their emergency lights and pulled their police cruiser
behind the driver’s vehicle.93  The Anderson court found the officers seized
the driver, but that the Public Servant Exception justified the warrantless
seizure because it was reasonable for the officers to believe the driver
needed help after they observed the driver’s use of hazard lights.94
88. 362 P.3d 1232 (Utah 2015).
89. See id. at 1239.  While multiple jurisdictions use a balancing test, all of
which tend to have their own slight variations, the Supreme Court of Utah’s test in
Anderson illustrates the key considerations courts assess when weighing whether an
officer’s caretaking actions were reasonable. Compare id. (“[C]ourts must first eval-
uate the degree to which an officer intrudes upon a citizen’s freedom of move-
ment and privacy . . . Second, courts must determine whether ‘the degree of the
public interest and the exigency of the situation’ justified the seizure for commu-
nity caretaking purposes.”), with People v. McDonough, 940 N.E.2d 1100, 1109 (Ill.
2010) (holding courts must “ ‘balance a citizen’s interest in going about his or her
business free from police interference against the public’s interest in having police
officers perform services in addition to strictly law enforcement.’”), and State v.
Kramer, 759 N.W.2d 598, 611 (Wis. 2009) (holding courts must balance “(1) the
degree of the public interest and exigency of the situation; (2) the attendant cir-
cumstances surrounding the seizure, including time, location, the degree of overt
authority and force displayed; (3) whether an automobile is involved; and (4) the
availability, feasibility and effectiveness of alternatives to the type of intrusion actu-
ally accomplished.”).
90. Anderson, 362 P.3d at 1239.
91. See id. at 1239 (“[C]ourts must first evaluate the degree to which an officer
intrudes upon a citizen’s freedom of movement and privacy.  In doing so, courts
should look to both ‘the degree of overt authority and force displayed’ in effecting
the seizure, and the length of the seizure.”); id. (“In other words, how serious was
the perceived emergency and what was the likelihood that the motorist may need
aid?”).
92. See id. at 1234 (describing scene as officer approached driver’s vehicle).
93. See id. (describing “hazard lights, the cold weather, and the late hour” of
encounter).
94. State v. Anderson, 362 P.3d 1232, 1240 (Utah 2015) (holding driver was
seized when freedom of movement was restricted by officer’s show of force, but
seizure was nonetheless reasonable because officer would have reason to be con-
cerned about driver’s wellbeing and must at least stop and determine need for
assistance).
15
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The McCormick court pointed out, “[T]he overwhelming weight of au-
thority in this country . . . recognizes the community caretaking doctrine
as an exception to federal and state constitutional warrant require-
ments.”95  In Livingstone, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania added Penn-
sylvania to the list of states that recognize this exception.96 It did so by
adopting a reasonableness approach similar to the test in McCormick.97
III. THIS IS A STORY ALL ABOUT HOW THIS BODY OF CASE LAW
GOT FLIPPED, TURNED UPSIDE DOWN
In November 2017, Commonwealth v. Livingstone reached the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania when the defendant appealed a trial court ruling,
which the Superior Court affirmed, denying her motion to suppress her
breathalyzer and blood test results.98  The trial court held that the interac-
tion between the officer and defendant in Livingstone was a mere encoun-
ter, as opposed to a seizure, because the officer had an affirmative duty to
see if the defendant needed assistance.99  The Superior Court agreed, and
relying on Johonoson, added that the defendant’s action of stopping on the
highway should have led her to assume that Trooper Frantz activated his
emergency lights for assistance purposes.100  Thus, the lower courts
agreed Trooper Frantz did not seize the defendant during the initial inter-
action because the defendant should have felt free to leave.101
95. State v. McCormick, 494 S.W.3d 673, 685 (Tenn. 2016); see, e.g., Common-
wealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 626-35 (Pa. 2017) (listing states that recognize
Public Servant Exception: California, Delaware, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kentucky,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, Ne-
vada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, South Da-
kota, Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming).
96. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 613 (“[W]e take this opportunity to recognize
the public servant ‘exception’ to the warrant requirement under the community
caretaking doctrine, which in certain circumstances will permit a warrantless
seizure . . . .”).
97. See id. at 634 (“After careful consideration, we conclude that the reasona-
bleness test best accommodates the interests underlying the public servant excep-
tion while simultaneously protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
98. See id. at 615-16 (explaining lower courts’ reliance on Conte, Kendall, and
Johonoson while holding defendant not seized by Trooper Frantz).
99. See id. at 615 (acknowledging trial court’s denial of defendant’s motion to
suppress).  The trial court concluded Trooper Frantz’s approach of the defendant
to see if she needed assistance, with his emergency lights activated, was a mere
encounter. See id.; see also id. at 613 n.1 (explaining three levels of police-citizen
interactions: mere encounter, investigative detention, and arrest).  A mere en-
counter does not require any prerequisite level of suspicion or probable cause. See
id. (citing Commonwealth v. Strickler, 757 A.2d 884, 889 (Pa. 2000)).
100. See id. at 616 (highlighting Superior Court’s reliance on Johonoson).
101. See Livinstone, 174 A.3d at 615 (discussing defendant’s initial appeal of
trial court’s denial of her motion to suppress).  On initial appeal, the defendant
argued that her case was similar to Hill and Fuller in that she did no more than
lawfully and voluntarily pull her vehicle to the shoulder of the Interstate. See id.
16
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The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however, reversed the denial of
the motion to suppress.102  In doing so, the court created a per se rule that
an officer’s use of emergency lights automatically seizes a driver.103  The
court then took the additional step of adopting the Public Servant Excep-
tion, but it ultimately ruled the exception did not justify Trooper Frantz’s
conduct under the facts of the case.104  Therefore, the court vacated the
defendant’s sentence and remanded for further proceedings.105
A. What You Know ’Bout Me? What You Know ’Bout the Facts in
Commonwealth v. Livingstone?
In June 2013, Pennsylvania State Trooper Jeremy Frantz was driving
along Interstate 79 in a marked police vehicle around 9:30 p.m. when he
spotted the defendant’s vehicle pulled to the side of the road.106  The
vehicle was running, but the defendant had not activated her hazard
lights.107  This observation led Trooper Frantz to activate his emergency
lights and pull his police cruiser alongside the defendant’s vehicle to see if
she needed assistance.108  Trooper Frantz said the defendant met his in-
quiry with a “hundred mile stare” and “glossy eyes,” which led Trooper
The Superior Court, however, reasoned that a lack of outward signs of emergency
does not bar a safety check because drivers do not normally bring their vehicles to
a stop on the Interstate at night, and doing so suggests an emergency was present.
See id.
102. See id. at 638 (vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for further
proceedings).
103. See id. at 621 (“[C]onsideration of the realities of everyday life . . . we
simply cannot pretend that a reasonable person, innocent of any crime, would not
interpret the activation of emergency lights on a police vehicle as a signal that he
or she is not free to leave.”).  The Majority never explicitly announced a per se
rule, but the dissenting opinions applauded what they called the majority’s per se
rule regarding emergency lights seizing a driver. See, e.g., id. at 650 (Mundy, J.,
dissenting) (“[A]lthough the Majority identifies the totality of the circumstances, it
announces a per se rule that whenever police activate emergency lights during an
encounter, it is automatically a seizure.”); id. at 638-39 (“I agree with the majority’s
elimination of the legal fiction that a police officer engages in a mere encoun-
ter . . . when the officer activates the vehicle’s overhead lights and approaches a
parked motorist . . . .”).
104. See id. at 613 (“[A]lthough we take this opportunity to recognize the pub-
lic servant ‘exception’ to the warrant requirement under the community caretak-
ing doctrine, which in certain circumstances will permit a warrantless seizure, we
conclude that the doctrine does not justify the detention of Appellant under the
facts of this case.”).
105. See id. at 638 (vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for further
proceedings).
106. See id. at 613-14 (discussing background facts, wherein Trooper first ob-
served defendant’s vehicle on shoulder of Interstate 79).
107. See id. at 613 (describing Trooper Frantz’s point of view when first ob-
serving defendant’s vehicle).
108. See id. (describing Trooper Frantz activating emergency lights, rolling
down passenger window, and pulling alongside defendant’s vehicle to see if she
needed assistance).
17
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Frantz to pull off the highway and approach the defendant on foot.109
The defendant responded to Trooper Frantz’s questions with “confused
behavior,” leading Trooper Frantz to ask the defendant to take a
breathalyzer test that ultimately detected alcohol in the defendant’s
system.110  Accordingly, Trooper Frantz took the defendant to the police
barracks, where a blood test revealed her BAC of .205%.111  The Com-
monwealth charged the defendant with a number of DUI and alcohol re-
lated offenses.112  The trial court admitted the breathalyzer and blood test
results into evidence and ultimately convicted the defendant on all counts
after a non-jury trial.113  The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, however,
vacated the sentence and remanded the case.114
B. This Is How We Do It: Creating Two New Rules
The Livingstone court dispensed of the inconsistently applied rule that
emerged from the line of cases from Johonoson through Kendall.115  In do-
ing so, the Livingstone court created a rule that an officer will seemingly
always seize a driver when the officer uses emergency lights.116  The court
109. See id. (describing officer pulling onto shoulder in front of defendant’s
vehicle and discussing defendant’s initial interaction).  Upon observing the defen-
dant’s “hundred mile stare” and “glossy eyes,” Trooper Frantz pulled his vehicle,
with emergency lights still activated, in front of the defendant’s vehicle. See id.  A
second officer arrived on the scene and parked his patrol car behind the defen-
dant. See id.
110. See id. (recounting defendant’s responses to officer’s questions).  The de-
fendant began by telling the officer she was a CEO of five companies, she was
scared of the officer, and she believed that his stopping her would get her son into
trouble because of his enrollment at a military academy. See id.  The defendant
quickly began crying hysterically. See id.  The two officers on scene did not have a
breathalyzer test, so a third officer brought one to the location. See id. at 614-15; see
also id. at 614 (explaining third officer called to scene to administer portable
breathalyzer that ultimately indicated alcohol present in defendant’s system).
111. See id. at 614 (describing officers placing defendant under arrest and
taking her to police barracks for blood test, which confirmed her intoxication).
112. See id. at 614-15 (explaining defendant was convicted of all charges in
stipulated non-jury trial after court heard evidence of defendant’s breathalyzer and
blood test results from night of incident).
113. See id. at 614-15 (listing charges against defendant: DUI General Impair-
ment, DUI Highest Rate of Alcohol, and Careless Driving).
114. See id. at 638 (vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding).
115. See Commonwealth v. Kendall, 976 A.2d 503, 508 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2009)
(justifying officer’s conduct based on officer’s affirmative duty to render assistance
despite motorist showing no signs of need for assistance); Commonwealth v. Hill,
874 A.2d 1214, 1222 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2005) (holding use of emergency lights would
not be perceived by reasonable person as officer’s attempt to render aid when
driver did nothing more than lawfully pull to the shoulder); Commonwealth v.
Johonoson, 844 A.2d 556, 562-63 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (relying on driver’s use of
hazard lights, slow driving, and location on rural road at 3 a.m. to hold driver was
not seized because such facts would have made reasonable driver know officer
used emergency lights for assistance purposes).
116. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621 (acknowledging it was unreasonable to
think person would feel free to leave when officer activates emergency lights); see
18
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held, “[U]pon consideration of the realities of everyday life, particularly
the relationship between ordinary citizens and law enforcement, we simply
cannot pretend that a reasonable person . . . would not interpret the acti-
vation of emergency lights on a police vehicle as a signal that he or she is
not free to leave.”117
The Pennsylvania Driver’s Manual (“PDM”) and the Pennsylvania Mo-
tor Vehicle Code (the “Code”) produce these “realities of everyday
life.”118  Specifically, the PDM instructs that a driver will know when an
officer wants to pull the driver over by seeing that the officer has activated
the police vehicle’s emergency lights.119  Moreover, the PDM recom-
mends that anytime an officer stops behind a driver, that driver should
turn off the engine, limit physical movement, place his or her hands on
the steering wheel, and remain in the vehicle with the seatbelt fastened.120
Similarly, the Code makes it a second-degree misdemeanor to attempt
to elude an officer who uses visual signs instructing the driver to stop.121
The Code further requires that any driver who observes an approaching
emergency vehicle with its lights activated must pull to the shoulder of the
road and “stop and remain in that position until the emergency vehicle
has passed.”122  In light of the PDM and the Code, the Livingstone court
reasoned that the consequences of incorrectly assuming that one is free to
leave when seeing an officer’s emergency lights are so substantial that a
reasonable driver would not feel free to leave.123
also id. at 650 (Mundy, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Majority’s per se rule forces an officer
to choose between two equally hazardous scenarios.”).
117. Id. at 621.
118. See id. 621-22 (explaining sources of driver information suggesting un-
reasonableness of leaving when officer activates emergency lights).
119. See id. at 621 (“You will know a police officer wants you to pull over when
he or she activates the flashing red and blue lights on top of the police vehicle.”)
(quoting Pa. Drivers Manual at 78, available at https://www.dot.state.pa.us/Pub-
lic/DVSPubsForms/BDL/BDL%20Manuals/Manuals/PA%20Drivers%20Manual
%20By%20Chapter/English/PUB%2095.pdf [Permalink unavailable]).
120. See id. (“[The] procedures include turning off the engine and radio, roll-
ing down a window to enable communication with the officer, limiting their move-
ments and the movements of passengers; placing their hands on the steering
wheel; keeping the vehicle doors closed and remaining inside the vehicle; and
keeping their seatbelt fastened.”) (citing Pa. Drivers Manual at 78, available at
https://www.dot.state.pa.us/Public/DVSPubsForms/BDL/BDL%20Manuals/Man
uals/PA%20Drivers%20Manual%20By%20Chapter/English/PUB%2095.pdf).
121. See id. at 622 (explaining Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code’s prohibition
on willfully trying to elude or refusing to stop when officer gives visible sign for
driver to stop).
122. See id. (explaining Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Code’s legal require-
ments for drivers when emergency vehicles approach).
123. See id. (“The fact that motorists risk being charged with violations . . . if
they incorrectly assume they are free to leave after a patrol car, with its emergency
lights activated, has pulled behind or alongside of them further supports our con-
clusion that a reasonable person . . . would not have felt free to leave.”); see also id.
at 624-25 (highlighting sister states holding reasonable person would not feel free
to leave when seeing emergency lights).  Specifically, the court cited cases from
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Having found that Trooper Frantz seized the defendant when he pul-
led alongside the defendant’s vehicle with the police cruiser’s emergency
lights activated, the Livingstone court next analyzed whether the seizure
was reasonable.124  The court noted at the outset that no degree of suspi-
cion of criminal activity supported the seizure.125  Therefore, the court
acknowledged that Trooper Frantz’s conduct violated the defendant’s
Fourth Amendment rights unless one of the exceptions to the warrant
requirement justified the seizure.126
In the end, the court created a three-prong reasonableness test that it
decided simultaneously serves society’s need for police to perform caretak-
ing duties while also allowing individuals to enjoy their full Fourth Amend-
ment rights.127  The first prong of the three-part Livingstone Public Servant
Exception test states, “[P]olice officers must be able to point to specific,
objective, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an exper-
ienced officer that a citizen is in need of assistance.”128  The court rea-
soned that requiring officers to articulate specific, objective facts that
point to a driver’s need for assistance will “cabin reliance on the exception
and enable courts to properly assess its employment.”129  Essentially, the
first prong will help deter abuse of the exception.130
The second prong asserts that the officer’s caretaking conduct “must
be independent from the detection, investigation, and acquisition of crim-
inal evidence.”131  Here, the court deviated slightly from the United States
Supreme Court’s rule in Cady, which requires community caretaking ac-
tions to be “totally divorced” from criminal investigation.132  The Living-
stone court selected this lower “independent from” standard because to
hold otherwise “would ignore the multifaceted nature of police work and
Kansas, Maryland, Utah, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Idaho, Mary-
land, Montana, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, Vermont, Virginia, Washing-
ton, and Wyoming. See id.
124. See id. at 625 (determining whether seizure was justified under exception
to warrant requirement, concluding defendant was seized, and noting undisputed
there was no reasonable suspicion of criminal activity).
125. See id. (“[I]t is undisputed that the seizure was not supported by any
degree of suspicion of criminal activity . . . .”).
126. See id. (“[W]e will proceed to determine whether [the warrantless
seizure] was otherwise justified under the Fourth Amendment.”).
127. See id. at 634 (“After careful consideration, we conclude that the reasona-
bleness test best accommodates the interests underlying the public servant excep-
tion while simultaneously protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
128. Id.
129. See id. at 635 (explaining meticulous inquiry of officer’s proffered facts
will prevent broad law enforcement reliance on new exception).
130. See id. (explaining requirement that officers point to specific, objective
facts limits risk posed by departing from Cady’s more stringent “totally-divorced”
language).
131. Id. (defining second prong).
132. See id. at 635-36 (acknowledging departure from Cady test).
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force police . . . to expose themselves to dangerous conditions.”133  The
second prong allows officers to have subjective, contemporaneous con-
cerns about criminal activity, so long as the objective facts pointing to a
need for assistance in the first prong are present.134
The third prong requires “the level of intrusion [to] be commensu-
rate with the perceived need for assistance.”135  Police conduct, then, must
be tailored to providing assistance or mitigating the emergency.136  Once
the officer has provided help or mitigated the peril, any further action will
require reasonable suspicion or probable cause that someone has commit-
ted a crime.137
The Livingstone court found that the Public Servant Exception did not
justify Trooper Frantz’s actions.138  The court held that the Common-
wealth could not satisfy the first prong of the new test because Trooper
Frantz could not point to any specific and objective facts suggesting the
defendant needed help.139  The court highlighted that Trooper Frantz
had not received a report of a driver in distress, the defendant’s car exhib-
ited no signs of emergency, the vehicle did not have its hazard lights on,
and there was no inclement weather.140  Thus, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania ruled that the trial court should have granted the defen-
dant’s motion to suppress the evidence.141
IV. EVERY ROSE HAS ITS THORNS: ADVICE FOR PRACTITIONERS IN LIGHT
OF LIVINGSTONE’S POSITIVE CHANGES BUT
IMPERFECT APPLICATION
The Livingstone holding created two new rules.142  The court first held
that an officer seizes a driver for Fourth Amendment purposes the mo-
133. Id. at 636 (explaining forcing officers to suppress subjective fears of crim-
inal activity could subject them to harm when performing caretaking duties).
134. See id. at 636-37 (addressing concerns about less stringent standard than
one articulated in Cady); see also Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973)
(articulating totally divorced standard).
135. Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637.
136. See id. (“[T]he action taken by police must be tailored to rendering assis-
tance or mitigating the peril.”).
137. See id. (“Once assistance has been provided or the peril mitigated, fur-
ther police action will be evaluated under traditional Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence.”).
138. See id. (applying new test and finding Commonwealth could not satisfy
first prong).
139. See id. (explaining why Commonwealth failed first prong).  “Regardless
of his intentions, based on our review of the record, Trooper Frantz was unable to
articulate any specific and objective facts that would reasonably suggest that Appel-
lant needed assistance.” Id. at 638.
140. See id. (“[A]lthough it was dark, the weather was not inclement.  Finally,
Appellant, who was inside her vehicle, did not have her hazard lights on.”).
141. See id. (vacating defendant’s sentence and remanding for further
proceedings).
142. See id. (summarizing two new rules).
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ment the officer activates the police vehicle’s emergency lights.143  The
court further held that this type of seizure will be reasonable under the
Public Servant Exception if the officer can (1) articulate specific and ob-
jective facts that would allow an experienced officer to believe the driver
needed assistance, (2) demonstrate the officer’s actions were independent
from investigation of criminal activity, and (3) show the officer tailored his
or her actions to rendering assistance.144  The Livingstone court’s determi-
nation that Trooper Frantz did not have justification to seize the defen-
dant, however, sets a high bar for what constitutes the “objective facts” an
officer must articulate before attempting to provide assistance.145
Livingstone will impact police officers, prosecutors, and defense coun-
sel moving forward.146  Police departments not only need to update of-
ficers on the change in case law, but they should also devise internal
policies to guide officers in complying with the new framework.147  For
prosecutors, the high threshold the court set in Livingstone may make it
difficult to invoke the Public Servant Exception, but prosecutors may ben-
efit in the long run by trying to expand the newly adopted warrant excep-
tion into other types of search and seizure scenarios.148  The opposite is
true for defense counsel.149  While Livingstone appears favorable to de-
fendants, defense counsel must deal with yet another exception to the war-
rant requirement that prosecutors can employ when attempting to salvage
evidence.150
[W]e conclude that, because a reasonable person in Appellant’s position
would not have felt free to leave after Trooper Frantz pulled his patrol
car, with its emergency lights activated, alongside her vehicle, Appellant
was seized and subjected to an investigative detention. Furthermore, we
recognize that a warrantless search or seizure may nonetheless be
deemed reasonable under the Fourth Amendment when conducted pur-
suant to the public servant exception to the warrant requirement under
the community caretaking doctrine.
Id.
143. See id. at 621 (finding it unreasonable for driver to feel free to leave upon
seeing emergency lights).
144. See id. at 637 (summarizing newly articulated test).
145. See id. at 639 (Baer, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that the specific . . .
facts (that Appellant’s car was stopped on the shoulder of a highway, rather than a
rest stop, gas station, or the like) warranted the minimal intrusion of Trooper
Frantz slowly approaching in his vehicle and peering at Appellant to ensure her
well-being.”).
146. See generally Dimino, supra note 10, at 1494-1502 (discussing various ap-
proaches and pros and cons of each method).
147. See Martinelli, supra note 11 (educating police officers on community
caretaking searches, demonstrating need to keep officers up to date).
148. See Dimino, supra note 10, at 1494-1502 (explaining various ways in
which courts have applied community caretaking exceptions, including entry into
home).
149. See id. at 1487 (explaining “substantial risk of abuse” inherent in commu-
nity caretaking exceptions).
150. See generally Naumann, supra note 36, at 326-27 (listing and explaining
exceptions to Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
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A. I’m Starting with the Man in the Mirror; I’m Asking Him to Change His
Ways: Police Compliance with Livingstone
In cases where a driver pulls to the shoulder of the road and activates
the vehicle’s hazard lights, or cases where there is obvious damage to the
car in question, it will be relatively easy for officers to comply with the new
Livingstone rules.151  The objective signs of a need for assistance will allow
the officer to seize the driver until the officer renders assistance.152  Not
every case will be so easy.153
The court held that simply seeing a car on the shoulder of the road,
without additional evidence of distress, is insufficient to trigger the Public
Servant Exception.154  Post-Livingstone, an officer in such a scenario must
make a difficult decision: (1) the officer can pull alongside the vehicle
without emergency lights, thus risking the safety of oncoming motorists,
the driver, and the officer; (2) the officer can pull next to the vehicle with
his or her emergency lights activated, thus violating the driver’s Fourth
Amendment rights; or (3) the officer can simply continue driving, thus
risking abandonment of a driver who may be incapacitated or inside a
vehicle without electronic functions.155  Despite this judicially contrived
predicament, officers must adapt to Livingstone.156
The first step police departments should take in guiding officers is to
inform them of the new framework.157  Police officers in the Common-
wealth must now resist the urge to perform caretaking duties unless they
see clear signs that a citizen is in distress.158  Further, officers must be
aware that any use of their emergency lights directed at an individual will
151. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 638 (Pa. 2017) (ex-
plaining Trooper Frantz would have been justified in seizing defendant if he had
received report of vehicle in need of assistance, seen hazard lights, or there was
inclement weather).
152. See id. (discussing factors officers can rely upon to justify reasonable be-
lief citizen is in peril or needs assistance).
153. See generally id. (illustrating facts are not always straightforward due to
fact-specific nature of these types of cases).
154. See id. at 637-38 (applying new test and finding Commonwealth could
not satisfy first prong for failure to articulate objective signs of need for assistance).
155. See id. at 621 (holding officer use of lights seizes driver); Commonwealth
v. Conte, 931 A.2d 690, 694 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2007) (explaining safety reasons of-
ficers use emergency lights: alerting oncoming motorists of stopped vehicles and
informing driver person approaching is an officer rather than dangerous
stranger).
156. See generally Dimino, supra note 10, at 1494-1502 (discussing various ap-
proaches and pros and cons of each method); Martinelli, supra note 11 (educating
police officers on community caretaking searches, demonstrating need to keep
officers up to date).
157. See Martinelli, supra note 11 (advising police on complying with commu-
nity caretaking searches generally).
158. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 638 (acknowledging Trooper Frantz’s good
intentions, but holding he ultimately violated defendant’s Fourth Amendment
rights).
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constitute a seizure and trigger that person’s full Fourth Amendment
protections.159
Police departments should also create internal policies to help of-
ficers comply with Livingstone.160  It is critical that these policies require
officers to write reports with very specific facts that support an officer’s
belief that it was reasonable to seize a driver for assistance purposes.161
Without such specificity, it is easy to picture an officer articulating signs of
emergency before the court, many months after the interaction, only to
have defense counsel point to the absence of those facts in the report that
the officer wrote shortly after the incident.162  Such inconsistencies could
be devastating to the Commonwealth’s case.163
B. Mr. Brightside: Prosecutors Making the Most of an Unfavorable
Livingstone Application
On its face, Livingstone is very favorable to the defense.164  The Com-
monwealth could not invoke the Public Servant Exception even though
Trooper Frantz saw the defendant’s vehicle pulled to the shoulder of a
highway at night.165  The Livingstone court’s holding means that a prosecu-
tor who raises the newly adopted Public Servant Exception in response to
a motion to suppress will face a heightened standard for what facts point
to an emergency.166  Thus, in roadside cases, it may now be more difficult
for prosecutors to prevail against a defendant’s motion to suppress evi-
dence than would have been the case before Livingstone.167  Nevertheless,
159. See id. at 621 (“[W]e simply cannot pretend that a reasonable person,
innocent of any crime, would not interpret the activation of emergency lights on a
police vehicle as a signal that he or she is not free to leave.”).
160. See id. at 634 (“[P]olice officers must be able to point to specific, objec-
tive, and articulable facts that would reasonably suggest to an experienced officer
that a citizen is in need of assistance.”).
161. See id. at 637 (highlighting meticulous nature in which courts will ensure
exception is not being abused or used as pretext for criminal investigation).
162. See id. (easing fears that new exception will be abused by highlighting
requirement that officers be “able to point to specific, objective, and articulable
facts . . . [allows courts to] meticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the
exception in a manner that mitigates the risk of abuse”).
163. See id. at 637 (stating careful application will compensate for lesser
standard).
164. See id. at 638 (Pa. 2017) (holding Trooper Frantz observing defendant
pulled to shoulder of Interstate was insufficient to invoke exception). But see Mari-
nos, supra note 36, at 250-51 (implying expansive nature of Community Caretaking
Doctrine comparable to license for officer to break into citizens’ homes).
165. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 638 (holding Trooper Frantz’s well-meaning
intentions were not enough for exception).
166. See id. at 640 (Baer, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that the specific . . .
facts (that Appellant’s car was stopped on the shoulder of a highway, rather than a
rest stop, gas station, or the like) warranted the minimal intrusion of Trooper
Frantz slowly approaching in his vehicle and peering at Appellant to ensure her
well-being.”).
167. See id. at 638 (explaining Trooper Frantz’s altruistic motives were insuffi-
cient to justify seizing the defendant because seeing a vehicle pulled to the shoul-
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prosecutors should try to expand this new exception beyond the highway
setting.168
There are other potential scenarios where a Livingstone-based argu-
ment may help prosecutors.169  Suppose an officer is conducting a routine
patrol, and without any suspicion of criminal activity, hears someone
screaming for help inside an apartment.170  The officer forcibly enters the
premises and discovers evidence of a crime in plain view.171  Or imagine
an officer is one of the first responders to a fire, and while assisting the fire
department, the officer finds evidence of arson.172
Presumably, these scenarios fall under the emergency aid prong of
the exigent circumstances exception to the warrant requirement, meaning
the officer’s actions would not violate the Fourth Amendment because the
officer’s conduct was reasonable due to the temporal impracticality of ob-
taining a warrant before taking action.173  Nevertheless, Livingstone pro-
der of Interstate 79 at approximately 9:30 p.m. was not enough to serve as a
reasonable basis for Trooper Frantz’s belief the defendant needed assistance).
168. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996)
(“[A]lthough the Warrant Clause certainly is not irrelevant to the governmental
intrusion at issue here, that clause nevertheless is implicated to a lesser degree
when police officers act in their roles as ‘community caretakers.’”).
169. See generally People v. Slaughter, 803 N.W.2d 171, 174 (Mich. 2011) (dis-
cussing community caretaking doctrine’s applicability to home fire).
170. See Commonwealth v. Simpson, No. 1799 EDA 2016, 2018 Pa. Super.
LEXIS 264, at *5-10 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018) (applying Livingstone to apartment set-
ting).  The Superior Court in Simpson was the first court to apply Livingstone, and in
doing so, the Simpson court used Livingstone’s adoption of the Community Care-
taking doctrine to uphold the officers’ discovery of a handgun after the officers
entered and apartment when responding to a private alarm. See id.  When the
officers arrived, a seven-year-old child stood in the doorway, claimed to be home
alone, and could not explain the on-going alarm. See id. at *2.  The officers en-
tered the apartment to see if any adults were present, and while the officers did
not find any adults, they did find a gun out in the open. See id. at *2 n.1.  Defen-
dant was charged with child endangerment. See id.  Notably, the Simpson court
relied upon the Community Caretaking Doctrine more broadly, while making only
a passing mention of the Public Servant prong of the doctrine or its impact on the
necessary level of exigency. See id. at *1-10; see also, Sutterfield v. City of Milwaukee,
751 F.3d 542, 545 (7th Cir. 2014) (describing community caretaking and exigent
circumstances where woman expressed suicidal intentions).
171. See Sutterfield, 751 F.3d at 545-46 (describing officers forcibly entering
woman’s home).
172. See generally id. (holding Community Caretaking Doctrine applies no less
to firefighters than it does to police).
173. See Livingston, supra note 10, at 276 (“Courts operating within the as-
sumptions of the warrant preference theory have validated many community care-
taking intrusions . . . on the ground that they fall within variously formulated
‘exigent circumstances,’ ‘emergency,’ and ‘rescue’ exceptions to the probable-
cause-and-warrant formula.”); Guide for users, supra note 36, at 79 (explaining exi-
gent circumstances exception for Fourth Amendment warrant requirement).
“Government agents may conduct a warrantless search or seizure if (1) probable
cause supports the search or seizure and (2) ‘exigent circumstances’ exist.” Id.
But see Marinos, supra note 36, at 262 (criticizing courts’ inconsistent and “mud-
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vides prosecutors with a new tool in these types of scenarios.174  Federal
circuit courts are split as to whether the Community Caretaking Doctrine
applies outside the world of automobiles.175  Courts readily acknowledge
warrantless entries into homes under the exigent circumstances doc-
trine.176  Some circuits, and even a few state courts, moreover, hold that
prosecutors may invoke the exigent circumstances exception upon a lesser
showing of exigency if officers discovered the evidence while acting as
caretakers, rather than criminal investigators.177  These courts require a
dling” approach to community caretaking, exigent circumstances, and emergency
aid doctrines).
174. See, e.g., United States v. Rohrig, 98 F.3d 1506, 1523 (6th Cir. 1996) (dis-
cussing lessened exigency threshold when officer acts in caretaking function).
175. See Marinos, supra note 36, at 263-73 (explaining circuit splits as to
whether courts extend Community Caretaking Doctrine from vehicles to homes).
“The Third, Seventh, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits are the only circuits that firmly
restrict the CCD to automobiles and interpret the Cady decision narrowly.” Id.
These courts restrict community caretaking analyses to the vehicle context due to
their strong emphasis on the traditional sanctity and heightened expectation of
privacy regarding the home. See id. at 251 (criticizing courts that allow community
caretaking to act as “catchall” excuse for police invasions citizens’ of privacy
rights).  “The Fourth, Sixth, and Eighth Circuits expanded the scope of the CCD
to private residences by muddling the distinctions between the CCD and the emer-
gency aid exception.” Id. at 270.
The Sixth and Eighth Circuits have failed to properly adhere to Supreme
Court precedent, muddling the distinction between the CCD and the
emergency doctrine.  The emergency doctrine falls within the exigent cir-
cumstances exception to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement.
The CCD, on the other hand, is an exception to both the warrant and
probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  By failing to
keep these two doctrines separate, courts are allowing police to bypass
the need for a probable cause determination, jeopardizing the protec-
tions guaranteed under the Fourth Amendment.
Id.
176. See id. at 251-52 (“In Brigham City . . . the Supreme Court resolved the
dispute among courts . . . finding that ‘police may enter a home without a warrant
when they have an objectively reasonable basis for believing that an occupant is
seriously injured . . . .’”) (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 402
(2006)).
177. See id. at 275-76 (arguing courts extending Community Caretaking Doc-
trine to private residences have “sufficiently muddl[ed]” two distinct Fourth
Amendment exceptions—community caretaking and exigent circumstances).  Ms.
Marinos argues that the Supreme Court decision in Cady meant for the Commu-
nity Caretaking Doctrine to be a probable cause exception, rather than a warrant
exception, because the doctrine was supposed to be a Fourth Amendment carve-
out for officers’ administrative duties that never require a warrant because they are
responsibilities divorced from criminal investigation. See id. at 277.  The emer-
gency doctrine, conversely, falls within the exigent circumstances exception, which
is an exception to the warrant, rather than probable cause, requirement. See id. at
274 (explaining probable cause still required, even if an exception negates need
for a warrant). “The CCD . . . is an exception to both the warrant and probable
cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment.  By failing to keep these two doc-
trines separate, courts are allowing police to bypass the need for a probable cause
determination, jeopardizing the protections guaranteed under the Fourth Amend-
ment.” Id. at 274; see also Helding, supra note 11, at 143-48 (listing state courts
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lesser showing of exigency because the officers are not engaged in the
“competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime.”178
Unfortunately for prosecutors in Pennsylvania, the Third Circuit does
not agree with this lessened-exigency theory.179  Still, Pennsylvania courts
are not bound by that view, and prosecutors should make the argument
that acting in a community caretaker role lessens the amount of exigency
an officer must show to rely on the exigent circumstances exception.180
By attempting to expand the applicability of the Public Servant Exception,
prosecutors may be able to salvage the Livingstone court’s stringent applica-
tion of these new rules.181
C. Highway to the Danger Zone: Advice for Defense Counsel on Combating
Expansion of the Public Servant Exception
Defense counsel may benefit from the high bar Livingstone set for trig-
gering the Public Servant Exception in the short-term, but must be weary
in the long-term that the newly recognized exception does not stifle de-
fendants’ Fourth Amendment protections.182  As Justice Brandeis fa-
mously said, “The greatest dangers to liberty lurk in insidious
encroachment by men of zeal, well-meaning but without understand-
ing.”183  Defense counsel will be called upon to resist any prosecution at-
extending community caretaking analysis from vehicles to homes: Maryland, Vir-
ginia, California, South Dakota, and Wisconsin).
178. Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1523.
179. See Ray v. Twp. of Warren, 626 F.3d 170, 177 (3d Cir. 2010) (disagreeing
with Sixth Circuit decision lessening requisite level of exigency for exigent circum-
stances exception because officers acted in caretaking function because Commu-
nity Caretaking Doctrine should, according to court, be limited to vehicles). But
see Marinos, supra note 36, at 266 (suggesting Third Circuit ruling in Ray did not
expressly hold community caretaking cannot extend to homes).  “The court stated
that the CCD could not justify the warrantless search of a home, though it did not
find the police accountable because the law regarding the application of the CCD
was not clearly established in the Third Circuit prior to this case.” Id.
180. See Rohrig, 98 F.3d at 1523 (demonstrating how caretaking argument can
be applied to exigent circumstances); Marinos, supra note 36, at 276 (“[B]oth the
Sixth and Eighth Circuits applied ‘a modified exigent circumstances test, with per-
haps a lower threshold for exigency if the officer is acting in a community caretak-
ing role,’ sufficiently muddling what was meant to be two distinct exceptions to
Fourth Amendment requirements.”) (quoting Ray, 626 F.3d at 176).
181. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 174 A.3d 609, 638 (Pa. 2017) (ex-
plaining Trooper Frantz would have been justified in seizing defendant if Trooper
Frantz had received report of vehicle in need of assistance, seen hazard lights, or
there was inclement weather).
182. See id. at 640 (Baer, J., dissenting) (“I would hold that the specific . . .
facts (that Appellant’s car was stopped on the shoulder of a highway, rather than a
rest stop, gas station, or the like) warranted the minimal intrusion of Trooper
Frantz slowly approaching in his vehicle and peering at Appellant to ensure her
well-being.”).
183. Dimino, supra note 10, at 1487; see Marinos, supra note 36, at 263 (“After
the Supreme Court introduced the phrase ‘community caretaking’ in Cady, lower
courts adopted this language and manipulated its application.”).
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tempt to expand the Public Servant Exception beyond the defense-
favorable Livingstone holding.184
The second prong of the Livingstone test is a particular aspect of the
new framework that should raise concern for defense counsel.185  This
prong derives from the United States Supreme Court’s rule in Cady that
requires proper community caretaking functions to be “totally divorced”
from investigation of criminal activity.186  In Livingstone, however, the Su-
preme Court of Pennsylvania ruled that proper public servant functions
must only be “independent from” criminal investigation.187  The Living-
stone court supported this lesser standard with the reasoning that the “to-
tally divorced” language in Cady is impractical because it is not realistic or
wise to force officers to suppress subjective suspicion of crime or
danger.188
The Livingstone court did provide the disclaimer that “courts must me-
ticulously consider the facts and carefully apply the exception in a manner
that mitigates the risk of abuse.”189  This is where the role of defense
counsel appears.190  Each suppression hearing involving the Public Ser-
vant Exception will be fact-intensive.191  The best approach for defense
counsel will be to search for and frame specific facts suggesting the of-
ficer’s proffered community caretaking justifications were pretext for
criminal investigation.192  While this is more difficult under Livingstone
than it would be under Cady, a defendant’s freedom may depend on an
184. See Marinos, supra note 36, at 263 (warning of potential for abuse of
exception).
185. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 635 (“Second, we hold that, in order for the
public servant exception of the community caretaking doctrine to apply, the police
caretaking action must be independent from the detection, investigation, and ac-
quisition of criminal evidence.”).
186. See Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (“Local police of-
ficers . . . frequently investigate vehicle accidents in which there is no claim of
criminal liability and engage in what, for want of a better term, may be described
as community caretaking functions, totally divorced from the detection, investiga-
tion, or acquisition of evidence . . . .”).
187. See Commonwealth v. Livingstone, 173 A.3d 609, 635 (Pa. 2017) (articu-
lating “independent from” investigation of crime requirement).
188. See id. at 636 (“Regardless of the language used, a critical component of
the community caretaking doctrine is that the police officer’s action be based on
specific and articulable facts which, viewed objectively and independent of any law
enforcement concerns, would suggest to a reasonable officer that assistance is
needed.”).
189. Id. at 637.
190. See id. at 641 (Donohue, J., dissenting) (contrasting majority’s rule with
U.S. Supreme Court’s rule in Cady); see also Marinos, supra note 36, at 250-51 (“To-
day, courts have manipulated this police function into a doctrine, the community
caretaker doctrine (CCD), and several circuit courts of appeal have expanded the
CCD to include the search of private residences.”).
191. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 637 (highlighting meticulous fashion in
which court will ensure specific, objective facts).
192. See id. (requiring meticulous inquiry).
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exception-swallowing-the-rule type argument, and defense counsel should
not rest in the false sense of security Livingstone creates.193
V. CLOSING TIME: EVERY NEW BEGINNING COMES FROM
SOME OTHER BEGINNING’S END
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania identified that a police officer
seizes an individual when directing police emergency lights towards that
individual because a reasonable person in such a situation would not feel
free to leave the scene.194  The court made this new seizure rule workable
by adopting the Public Servant Exception.195  Pennsylvania’s three-prong
reasonableness test for the exception enables officers to seize individuals
for legitimate caretaking activities, so long as the officer’s actions are rea-
sonable, independent of criminal investigation, and tailored to providing
assistance.196  Finally, the Livingstone court’s application of these new rules
to the facts of the case set a high threshold for invoking the new excep-
tion, which will ultimately require police departments, prosecutors, and
defense counsel to adapt to both the new exception itself and the way in
which the court applied it.197
193. See Dimino, supra note 10, at 1487 (discussing potential for abuse of ex-
ception). Compare Cady v. Dombrowski, 413 U.S. 433, 441 (1973) (articulating “to-
tally divorced” standard), with Livingstone, 173 A.3d at 637 (articulating
“independent from” standard).
194. See Livingstone, 174 A.3d at 621 (“[W]e simply cannot pretend that a rea-
sonable person, innocent of any crime, would not interpret the activation of emer-
gency lights on a police vehicle as a signal that he or she is not free to leave.”).
195. See id. at 613 (“[W]e take this opportunity to recognize the public servant
‘exception’ to the warrant requirement under the community caretaking doctrine,
which in certain circumstances will permit a warrantless seizure . . . .”).
196. See id. at 634 (“After careful consideration, we conclude that the reasona-
bleness test best accommodates the interests underlying the public servant excep-
tion while simultaneously protecting an individual’s Fourth Amendment right to be
free from unreasonable searches and seizures.”).
197. See id. at 638-40 (Baer, J., dissenting) (discussing desire for more lenient
application of Public Servant Exception).
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